#1004: Early Design Review: Allowing First-Party SameSite=None Cookies in Sandboxed Contexts

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Opened Oct 16, 2024

こんにちは TAG-さん!

I'm requesting a TAG review for allowing SameSite=None cookies in first-party sandboxed contexts in browsers with third-party cookie (3PC) restrictions.

In order to prevent malicious attacks from untrusted content, servers can include a Content-Security-Policy: sandbox HTTP header or sandbox attribute on an embedded iframe. This policy results in the browser treating the frame as an opaque origin, and requests originating from it cannot include SameSite=Strict/Lax cookies. However, for the purposes of 3PC blocking, the opaque origin also causes the browser to treat same-site subresource embeds on the top-level as cross-site, so SameSite=None cookies are also excluded from requests.

To preserve legacy behavior and mitigate future breakage due to 3PC blocking, we would like to introduce a method for servers to indicate to the browser that they wish a sandboxed context to include first-party SameSite=None cookies in requests using a Content-Security-Policy or HTML iframe sandboxing value: 'allow-same-site-none-cookies'.

Further details:

  • I have reviewed the TAG's Web Platform Design Principles
  • The group where the incubation/design work on this is being done (or is intended to be done in the future): Web Application Security WG
  • The group where standardization of this work is intended to be done ("unknown" if not known): unknown
  • Existing major pieces of multi-implementer review or discussion of this design:
  • Major unresolved issues with or opposition to this design: None so far
  • This work is being funded by: Google

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