#400: Font Table Access API
Discussions
2022-05-23
Rossen: if I remember... our main feedback has been you wouldn't want to expose this level of access direct, and instead prefer to see work happening in the form of font ?? being exposed. Is that right?
Peter: we closed this back in May last year and they came back in Feb and asked to reopen because they addressed a lot of our issues. We need to go back and take a look at the changes.
Rossen: fair. Will need some work. High level question is did we leave a comment about font features and exposing that functionality? Which is already exposed in CSS. or is that not enough?
Peter: I don't recall specifics about font features
Rossen: want to figure out the graunalrity of access and why they need font table access in particular, let alone exposing them. Need to look more.
Dan: agenda for +2 weeks.
2022-07-11
Dan: Re-opened in March due to new information.
Rossen: reviewing new info
Dan: they think they've resolved the issues we raised in 2020.
Peter: a lot closed without explanation of how they were addressed.
Rossen: reviews status of linked issues
Peter: Joshua Bell is now main editor for the spec.
Rossen: I'd ask - what the actual resolutions to these issues?
Peter: I seem to recall that we didn't want to see 399 happen - TAG consensus was that we'd rather see a chooser than enumeration API. They still have an enumeration.
Rossen: I want to see where these issues are resolved - i looked through some of the commits they have - they added fingerprinting - but no clue what answer to ToC in explainer means...
Peter: older vers of API was only exposing one font format - now it looks like their API just returns a blob of bytes. Their response is "here's bytes parse it yourself" - which seems the exact opposite of what we're asking for which was "parse it but don't just to opentype".
Peter: regarding fingerprinting - no mitigation suggestions just some info - for example "in incognito mode, don't expose the fonts" or something similar.
Dan: it doesn't really look like they've resolved the issues we've raised.
Peter: they did add a "prompt the user to choose" step.
Dan: not mentioned - that should be listed under mitigations in the privacy & security section - and highlighted in their comment on our issue.
Peter: yeah it's not mentioned anywhere... They did throw in a choose but their mechanism is still "give me all the fonts" and then allow user to choose which fonts to expose - we asked for "let the user choose a font and then you get back a font". Users will just hit "select all" and move on.
Peter: they say users of this API will want to provide data to libraries that expect all the fonts... justification for blob approach. Curious what libraries they are talking about. Seems the goal of this API should be to replace those libraries.
Rossen: agree.
Rossen: will leave feedback accordingly.
Dan: LGTM
Peter: yeah.
Rossen: posts comment
2022-08-08
Peter: google shipped the prompt...
Lea: they shipped enumeration... this is access to font tables.
Dan: good to see they've added an issue on incognito mode behavior in response to our feedback.
2022-08-15
Peter: I think we did not get to this at the f2f. Chrome is shipping.
Lea: didn't we recommend they have a picker instead? How is this different?
Peter: originally they had an api that enumerates all the fonts - we pushed back and said do a picker. They came back with a picker that is multi select and makes it easy for the user to pick all the fonts on the system. They wanted to expoxe open type metrics, we said how about being format agnostic. They said here's a blob with all the data, you parse it. They say they have a use case for raw font data for libraries. Acceptable for give me a blob of font 2, but I suspect they are focussing on one use case and aren't looking at bigger picture. Suspect authors want to be able to get some metadata without bringing in a big font parsing library.
Rossen: they don't seem very receptive to our feedback. For private browsing mode point they say ack but they won't do anything about it. Less than great. Given how much fonts are used for tracking I don't now about making this explicitly available will improve anything.
Tess: over the course of this review - a couple of years - we've filed a bunch of issues on their repo, at least 6, more, and at least 3 are still open. The ones that are still open feel pretty foundational to me. I'm not terribly enthused with the charging full speed ahead while leaving those things unaddressed
Dan: sounds like not satisfied - level of engagement, taken our issues seriously, and moving forward with major points unresolved
Amy: and not satisfied with adding an api that increases fingerprinting?
Dan: +1
Tess: there are some hardliners who don't want to add any more bits at all and that's not as nuanced as it needs to be. There are some APIs that are incredibly beneficial that adds some fingerprinting, let's do it. But in this case getting interesting font data for a specific font is potentially many interesting bits of fingerprinting, so the benefit has to be proportionally massive to justify that. We're working with a theoretical privacy budget of 31 bits or whatever before you're done, that's a small number of bits, this could blow right past that.
Rossen: how is allowing the file upload in incognito the same as exposing specific fonts on the system or elsewhere?
Dan: it's not, it's a total red herring
Rossen: they're saying that.. exposure of specific fonts seem comparable. I don't see how that is the case.
Tess: <devil's advocate> let me make the argument for a second.. file upload dialogue, I pick something unique from my filesystem, game over. Also a thing I can do with a filepicker is go to wherever the os keeps the fonts and pick the font file and upload that. If there's a specialised api that only lets you get at the font data, that's a strict subset of what the file dialogue can do.</devil's advocate>
Rossen: one is an explicit user action where I go and choose a bunch of stuff. The other is a function someone wrote running on my system selecting fonts and sending them to somewhere else...
Tess: I think that's why that argument doesn't hold water. From the user perspective they're totally different things.
Dan: writing "unsatisfied" closing post
Tess: Anne wrote issue - the crux ofthe matter - we need to be deliberate as stewards of the web platform about the question of how do we represent fonts. We need to specify that really well and not just punt to common file formats. That's a lot of work. I understand they're reluctant. But without serious thought about what is an abstraction that fits the use cases that we can code to so we're not dependant on file format details, that we're future-proofed, would go a long way to mitigate the privacy concern as well. The way that a specific opentype font got expressed into that platform abstraction could be done in a way that hid the sensitive stuff and let through the glyph information they need or whatever it is. That's a lot of spec work. The timelines that we do work on the web platform need to be long term.
Peter: I think they are focussed on enabling certain functionality and not thinking about the overall state of the web
Tess: it's our job to comment on that
Amy: could we be more strong about it being harmful?
Peter: I'd be okay with that
Dan: I don't think it would help
Tess: I like your comment as drafted. I don't think we need to say more about that.
<blockquote>Hi folks. The issues as we see them so far:
- there are a number of unresolved issues which have been raised during the course of this review (e.g. #19, #20, #62, etc.)
- the fingerprinting risk is quite large here. There's always a tradeoff to be made regarding fingerprinting surface area and new functionality - however in our view the high risk is not comensurate with the benefit in this case.
- the API seems to be on a trajectory to ship regardless of our feedback and the other negative feedback surfaced on this issue.
In conclusion: we think we should be more deliberate as stewards of the web platform in terms of how we represent fonts. We don't think this is the right approach to solve these use cases in the context of the wider web.
</blockquote>Rossen: posts comment
OpenedAug 7, 2019
こんにちはTAG!
I'm requesting a TAG review of:
Further details:
We recommend the explainer to be in Markdown. On top of the usual information expected in the explainer, it is strongly recommended to add:
We'd prefer the TAG provide feedback as (please select one):
Please preview the issue and check that the links work before submitting. In particular, if anything links to a URL which requires authentication (e.g. Google document), please make sure anyone with the link can access the document.
¹ For background, see our explanation of how to write a good explainer.